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In this article, the use of gender quotas to strengthen gender equality on corporate boards is explored. Examining
national practices in ten European countries we provide an overview, categorizing the design of various corporate
board quotas (CBQs) and the contexts in which they are embedded. In particular, similarities and differences along
two dimensions are investigated: the design of the CBQs in terms of their hardness and progressiveness, and the
institutional context in which they are embedded. From patterns of design and context configurations, different quota
scenarios are discerned. We advance the discussion of female representation and the strategies of corporate boards
beyond the rather misleading dichotomy of voluntary targets versus mandatory quotas, proposing a framework for
understanding various CBQ designs. Moreover, we suggest that the configuration of design and institutional context,
resulting in different quota scenarios affects female representation on corporate boards.
Introduction
Women remain underrepresented on corporate boards
worldwide. Alongside major gender equality pillars such
as equal rights and equal pay, equality in decision-making,
including a better gender balance in business leadership, is
an important goal of strategies such as those implemented
by the European Union and various institutions and
countries (e.g., European Commission, 2016). Despite a
basic agreement about the theoretical desirability of
gender equality, many instances of inequality remain,
most saliently in top corporate positions. The proportion
of women at the board level is around only 23.9% in
Europe’s largest listed companies even though an array
of initiatives to remedy this situation have been introduced
in various countries in recent years (European
Commission, 2017).
Much debate has ensued over which policies or
initiatives are most likely to achieve the goal of gender
equality in top corporate positions (Klettner et al., 2016).
Within political discussions and academic research, two
differing pathways to equality are often presented: the
radical approach and the liberal approach. The former is
concerned with outcomes (i.e., quotas), and the latter is
concerned with fair procedures (i.e., bureaucratic
impartiality) (Jewson and Mason. 1986). On corporate
boards, various initiatives have become increasingly
popular. They include quotas and soft initiatives (targets).
Klettner et al. (2016, p. 413) stated that the discussion
about quotas vs. targets revolves around this question:
‘Is it best to prescribe outcomes and force compliance,
or suggest outcomes and permit flexibility around their
achievement?’ Soft approaches aim for incremental and
gradual increases in the number of women on boards
(WoB), assuming a shared desire to change the culture
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and procedures for selecting and nominating board
members (Sojo et al., 2016). The intention is to persuade
companies and key actors to work toward cultural change
(Spender, 2012; Klettner et al., 2016). Proponents of
radical approaches doubt a shared desire and/or the speed
of change, assuming that enforced obligation is necessary
to create change. Thus, the radical intervention of gender
quotas is often considered the ‘ultimate’ political option
when voluntary attempts to increase female representation
on boards fail (Grosvold and Brammer, 2011). European
countries that have introduced corporate board quotas
(CBQs) were the focus of this study.
In 2003, Norway became the first country to introduce a
CBQ, having major international impact. While CBQs
remain controversial, by the beginning of 2018, ten
European countries had introduced them,1 although with
significant differences in design. While the
implementation of CBQs are assumed to strengthen basic
gender equality (Seierstad et al., 2017), triggering social
and cultural change toward greater gender equality is a
complex process. In particular, change is considered a
collaborative societal endeavor, contingent upon both
broad societal support and situational ‘fit’ (Burnes,
1996). Political initiatives such as CBQs are embedded
in a contextual setting that can foster or hinder success.
Moreover, the design of the laws might affect their
mandate for change (Schwindt-Bayer, 2009; Paxton and
Hughes, 2015). Thus, research suggests that CBQ designs
vary, and the contextual environments in which they
operate allude to acceptability and potential for change
(Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, 2018). Despite developments
and interest from various arenas, knowledge of the CBQs
in Europe is marginal because comprehensive, systematic,
and comparative studies are lacking (Hughes et al., 2017;
Kirsch, 2018).
Hence, in this paper, the CBQs introduced in ten
European countries were explored, aiming to provide a
systematic understanding of those CBQs. Their design
and content were analyzed for hardness (enforcement
and precision) and progressiveness (year of acceptance,
implementation schedule, quota target, requested increase,
duration, and scope). Moreover, the specific institutional
contexts (gender equality, history of interventions, and
political support) in which the CBQs were embedded
were explored. We suggest that configurations of CBQ
design and the institutional context result in differing
quota scenarios, affecting the potential for increasing
female representation on boards and beyond.
Subsequently, new insights into the transformative
potential of CBQs are introduced, andwe propose that this
potential depends on the countries’ respective designs and
contexts. The discussion of board initiatives is advanced
beyond the rather misleading dichotomy of voluntary
targets vs. mandatory quotas, and we propose a
framework for understanding the designs of various
CBQs.
Thus, we respond to calls for further comparative
studies through assessments of CBQ variations (Kirsch,
2018), calls for understanding quota initiatives and the
contexts in which they are embedded (Krook, 2007;
Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2010; Terjesen and Sealy,
2016), and calls for research to explore the link between
WoBs, CBQs, and potential wider equality reach (Kirsch,
2018).
Theoretical background: conceptualizing and
contextualizing quota laws
Since the early 2000s, studies have focused on WoB and
the use of policy interventions (Terjesen et al., 2015;
Terjesen and Sealy, 2016; Kirsch, 2018). This research
has received increased attention from various disciplines
in academia (e.g., business, finance, political science,
and sociology) and in business and political circles at both
national and supranational levels. As highlighted by
Kirsch’s (2018) comprehensive review, a recent stream
of WoB research has highlighted regulation of board
gender composition, which tends to follow one of two
courses. One focuses on antecedents of regulations, which
often examines institutional and cultural contexts (e.g.,
Terjesen et al., 2015) or the influences of actors (e.g.,
Seierstad et al., 2017); the other focuses on the effects of
regulations on firm outcomes, primarily economic
performance outcomes, which has revealed inconclusive
results (see Kirsch, 2018). However, few studies focus
on CBQ use, design, and impact. This research area is
considered to be in its ‘infancy stage’ (Hughes et al.,
2017, p. 346) and is dominated by country-specific studies
building on descriptive and/or secondary data (Terjesen
and Sealy, 2016; Kirsch, 2018).
Design of corporate board quotas
A quota is often seen as the ultimate option when
voluntary attempts to increase WoB have failed.
However, quotas—whether CBQs or quotas in the
political arena—are often used without a clear definition
(cf. Klettner et al., 2016; Spender, 2012) and can be
considered a ‘fuzzy’ concept that is differently understood
and adopted.
Hardness. Klettner et al. (2016, p. 413) argue that the
debate on interventions to foster gender equality on boards
can be reduced to ‘the long running regulatory debate of
1These are: Norway, Spain, Iceland, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Germany, Austria and Portugal. The Dutch CBQ expired in 2016; however,
the Parliament passed a bill that foresees legal targets in a two-stage period:
20% by 2019 and, if met, 30% by 2023; if not met, sanctions will be imposed
in 2019 (Kruisinga and Senden, 2017). Because of the legal nature of this
target, we continue to consider it a CBQ (recently, as of December 2019 (after
the acceptance ofthis article), steps have been taken by the Dutch Government
to harden the quota from 2020).
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[…] hard versus soft law’.. Governance literature defines
hard and soft laws as two poles on a continuum of
enforceability, where hard law is ‘the one that is enforced
by the state as opposed to voluntary codes’ (Aguilera and
Jackson, 2010, p. 511). Schwindt-Bayer (2009) highlights
enforcement as a means to add to the importance and
legally-binding character of quota regulations. While
quotas are usually thought of as hard laws (Klettner
et al., 2016), a closer look reveals ‘a more mosaic picture’
(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma, 2009, p. 401) with
variations between quota laws and their degrees of
hardness.
Abbott and Snidal (2000) formulated criteria for hard
law, assuming that a weakening of these will lead to
softening. They refer to obligation and delegation (both
related to enforcement) and to wording precision.
Preciseness of wording is assumed to increase legal
certainty (Braithwaite, 2002; Edelman, 2016). Following
this logic, we argue that the precision with which a law
is worded will affect its potential impact. Imprecise
wording results in ‘indeterminacy’ (i.e., a lack of clarity
as to the exact goal of a legal prescription) and thus
‘constitutes contested terrain for social and political
actors’ (Edelman, 2016, p. 43). ‘Vagueness is a common
affliction of regulatory standards, especially those that rely
on such open-ended terms as “in the public interest”,
“feasible”, or “reasonable”’ (Diver, 1989, p. 200).
Generally, CBQs are assumed to reflect other laws and
corporate governance measures in showing disparities in
their degrees of hardness. In particular, CBQs might differ
in their levels of enforcement and wording precision,
which, taken together, affects the degree of hardness.
Progressiveness. Quotas are considered ‘radical’ political
interventions (Jewson and Mason, 1986). However, some
are more progressive than others. When Norway
introduced the first CBQ, it was progressive. Countries
introducing CBQs later were able to build on yearlong
experiences of CBQ forerunners; therefore, introducing
CBQs later is considered a less radical intervention. Also
the schedule for implementing a CBQ, and thus the time
to adjust to the intervention, affects progressiveness.
When companies are urged to appoint a certain number
of members of the underrepresented sex within a short
period of time, perceived progressiveness is high.
Moreover, the set quota target might affect gender-
related group dynamics. In her seminal work on group
types, Kanter (1977) defined a balanced group as one
with a ratio ranging from about 60:40 to 50:50. A ratio
around 65:35 describes a tilted group, and a ratio of
85:15 describes a skewed group. A uniform group
comprises one social type only (i.e., men or women).
Thus, CBQs prescribing balanced groups are more
progressive than CBQs targeting tilted or skewed groups.
Additionally, the target quota should be compared against
the level of female representation at the time of
implementation. A quota that aims to increase
representation ten-fold can be considered more
progressive than one that ‘merely’ intends to double
representation. In addition, laws can be designed
differently in terms of duration: While most laws are
implemented permanently, temporary approaches exist
(see Mensi-Klarbach et al., 2017). Another factor
determining the progressiveness of a given quota
regulation is its scope (the size and number of companies
affected).
Thus, the design and content of quotas are herein
conceptualized, building on the definition offered by Sojo
et al. (2016: 520): quotas are ‘government or industry
mandated percentages of representation or numbers of
each gender in leadership positions paired with clear
enforcement mechanisms’.. Drawing on WoB, legal, and
corporate governance literature, we propose that quota
hardness must be assessed by considering enforcement
and wording precision and that quota progressiveness
should be assessed using the year of acceptance,
implementation schedule, quota target, requested increase,
and the duration, scope, and coverage of the law.
National institutional contexts
Verloo and Lombardo (2007, p. 30) suggested that
‘different national political contexts may, in fact, affect
the framing of gender in/equality due to the influence of
specific cultural and political histories and ideologies’.
Institutional contexts and actors are recognized for their
importance in understanding the success or failure of
quotas in politics and boards (Terjesen et al., 2015;
Seierstad et al., 2017; Hughes et al., 2017; Lépinard and
Rubio-Marín, 2018). Because the contexts in which CBQs
are embedded impact their transformative potential
(Terjesen et al., 2015), it is relevant to ‘assess the extent
to which the domestic systems display either favourable
stimuli and incentives or conflicting structures and
adverse forces in the field of gender equality’ (Tesoka,
1999, p. 6). Teigen (2012, p. 139) suggested that ‘one
should look for the interplay between diffusion and
national-based factors, circumstances, and events’ to
understand developments in various countries.
Gender equality.Gender equality, and in particular female
labor participation and gendered welfare state provisions,
are considered relevant precursors to CBQs (Terjesen
et al., 2015). We expand this argument and suggest that
existing equality achievements within a country can also
affect the acceptability of quotas as a strategy for wider
equality. Gender equality achievements are often assessed
relative to the concept of gender regime, which can be
defined as ‘a set of inter-related gendered social relations
and gendered institutions that constitutes a system’
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(Walby, 2009, p. 301). Thus, we suggest that
acknowledging various factors (i.e., labor market
participation, prevalence of the male breadwinningmodel,
and welfare policies such as parental leave) and the overall
degree of equality in the national institutional context is
relevant.
History of equality initiatives. Multiple researchers (e.g.,
Teigen, 2012; Terjesen et al., 2015; Hughes et al., 2017;
Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, 2018) have alluded to the path
dependency or diffusion of policy initiatives, particularly
quotas in politics, as antecedents for the introduction and
acceptance of CBQs. Hence, policy initiatives could
explain other initiatives in terms of path dependency and
form part of the overall context regarding the acceptability
of equality initiatives. Gender equality initiatives have
been high on the agendas of international institutions.
However, differences among countries, even European
countries, regarding the scope and implementation of the
respective initiatives can be found (Liebert, 2002).
Terjesen et al. (2015, p. 237) suggest that ‘institutional
policy legacies in the effort toward gender equality’ are
important when introducing CBQs, pointing to policy
arenas and a history of equality initiatives in particular.
Suffrage was among the first rights fought for, and it
was followed by equality legislation, equal pay, and the
use of equality initiatives in the political setting.
Acknowledging that cultural change takes time, the
points of suffrage enactment, equality acts, and policy
interventions are important. Thus, countries’ paths and
points of introduction, whether of leaders or laggards in
gender equality initiatives (Liebert, 2002) and the overall
scope of quotas in politics, might affect both CBQ use
and acceptance.
Political support. Political support was a proposed
precursor of CBQ introduction. Terjesen et al. (2015)
suggested that left-leaning governments are more prone
to introduce CBQs, and Krook et al. (2009) proposed that
corporatist-consociational and hybrid (social democratic)
models are more likely to adopt quotas than liberal and
republican citizenship models. Both allude to the
importance of political support for introducing quotas as
a way to mitigate gender inequality. We expand these
two assumptions and propose that investigations into the
breadth of political support, not only when CBQs are
introduced, but also over time, are relevant, given the
volatility of the political setting and how it affects the
focus and support of CBQs and their potential. Thus, it
is important to examine the political setting, changes,
and support for CBQs post introduction.
For these reasons, we suggest taking the aspects of
gender equality status, history of political intervention,
and political support into account when seeking to
understand various contexts. These aspects allude to
distinct institutional contexts that can be considered
favorable, neutral, or unfavorable to CBQs and gender
equality and can affect both the design (Verloo and
Lombardo, 2007) and its potential for change (Terjesen
and Sealy, 2016).
Data and analysis
To compare and categorize national CBQs and the
contexts in which they are embedded, various methods
of data collection and analysis were used (see Hall and
Wright, 2008; Barratt et al., 2011). The data consisted of
CBQ texts of all European countries that had introduced
CBQs as of 2018 (Norway, Spain, Iceland, France, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and
Portugal), information about affected companies, female
representation on corporate boards, and extensive
information about the national, institutional, and political
contexts.
Corporate board quota laws. Legal CBQ texts were
available at national government websites or via EU
websites. Information about their hardness and
progressiveness was determined from legal texts, and
information about the affected companies was collected,
though difficult to obtain or in some cases incomplete.
Several databases (e.g., OECD, 2012; EC, 2014; also,
Statista and national stock exchanges) were necessarily
accessed to discern the approximate number of companies
affected by each quota. Moreover, data from the European
Institute for Gender Equality (www.eige.europa.eu) were
used to identify changes in the proportion of WoBs over
time in the largest listed companies for each country.
Institutional contexts. Information about the institutional
context for each country was systematically collected,
focusing on the status of gender equality, the history of
equality initiatives, and the political support both at
introduction and over time. Various sources were used
to triangulate and verify the data (Barratt et al., 2011).
Documents providing evidence of gender equality and
economic data were available from sources such as the
World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report
(2006; 2017) and EU documents (European Commission,
2016, 2017). Data describing the history of equality
initiatives were collected from EU country case material
and webpages about quotas in politics (www.
equalitylaw.eu; https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/
gender-quotas; www.quotaproject.org). Information
about the CBQ introduction process, including political
and societal reception and acceptance, was more difficult
to obtain. We intended to grasp ‘information related to
the subtle [and hard to detect] contextual conditions that
intensively impact the [quota] intervention’ (Pawson
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et al., 2005, p. 23); therefore, various academic sources
were tapped.2
Data analysis. Criteria derived from the theoretical
backgrounds, starting with the legal text and considering
it as the materialization of an agreed-upon solution arising
through negotiation between various actors in a specific
context, were compared across the ten countries. While
all CBQswere mandatory, differences in design leveraged
some degree of discretion. Thus, each text was content-
analyzed to gain ‘a scientific understanding of the law
itself’ (Hall and Wright, 2008, p. 64). In particular, the
degree of hardness, focusing on enforcement mechanisms,
sanctions, and wording precision of each law, and
progressiveness, focusing on year of acceptance,
implementation time, quota target, requested increase,
and duration, scope, and coverage of each law, was
examined. These criteria were analyzed and ranked, then
compared and contrasted between the countries to
holistically capture each national case (Hall and Wright,
2008; Ragin, 1987). Data were analyzed by each author
individually, and results were compared, discussing
incongruities to gain a shared understanding of each
country. The analysis was shared with legal scholars,
and the study was presented to outside experts to gain an
inter-subjective view on the judgments and evaluations
made.
The institutional contexts were then assessed, first
evaluating the gender equality status, gender rankings,
welfare policies, and labor market participation, then
evaluating the histories of equality initiatives, comparing
the points of introduction of major gender equality
regulations in place in each country. Leaders and laggards
of gender equality regulation were identified (Liebert,
2002). Additionally, quotas in politics based on
comprehensiveness and point of introduction were
assessed. Finally, the political support for CBQs at the
point of introduction and thereafter were examined.
Various sources were utilized and later verified for each
country by national experts. Together, these dimensions
suggest favorable, neutral, or unfavorable institutional
contexts.
In the last step, the CBQ design analysis was combined
with the contextual analysis to understand the various
combinations of contexts and laws as conjunctures. The
countries were compared (Ragin, 1987, p. 49), intending
to ‘unpack the mechanisms of how complex programs
work … in particular contexts and settings’ (Pawson
et al., 2005:).
Findings and analysis
Quota design: hardness
Enforcement. Seven CBQs were found to impose
sanctions for non-compliance and to describe clear
enforcement mechanisms (see Table 1). Most are
amendments to the national Company Acts, and thus rely
on enforcement bodies and procedures. A specific
enforcement body could not be found for the Spanish
quota, a part of the Spanish Equality Act, the Dutch Civil
Code, and the Icelandic Company Act.
Key differences in sanctions for non-compliance were
found. Norway prescribes dissolution if the regulation is
not fulfilled. The Italian CBQ is enforced through a fine
determined by company size and violation period. A more
common sanctioning mechanism, implemented by
France, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and Austria, is the
‘open seat’ approach: vacant board positions can be filled
only by the underrepresented sex. Additionally, in France
and Belgium, no fees are paid to the remaining board
members while a board seat remains open. In Portugal,
companies are fined if seats remain open beyond 360 days.
Germany and Austria prescribe the open seat approach
only as a legal sanction for non-compliance. In Spain,
Iceland, and the Netherlands, CBQs are not backed by
sanctions. The Spanish regulation, however, has certain
positive incentives in that companies seeking contracts
with the Spanish government will be treated preferentially
if they comply with the CBQ; thus, it is regarded as
advisory rather than compulsory. In the Netherlands,
companies that do not comply with the law must provide
an explanation of their actions; however, this is not backed
by sanctions either.
Wording precision. The ten CBQs were found to vary in
precision and length. Monitoring compliance is an
important precursor for potential sanctioning and thus
hardness of the laws. It serves to reduce ambiguity, and
thereby, the potential for circumvention.
The CBQs in all ten countries were found to provide
clear definitions of the affected legal entities. However,
differences in the ability to accurately identify the number
of affected companies were found (see Appendix 1). In
Norway, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Germany, the
CBQs apply to specific companies such as public limited
companies or publicly listed companies. These can be
identified and monitored via local stock exchanges and
official lists. Thus, in addition to clearly defining the
affected companies, those that must comply are easily
identifiable. On the other hand, in France, Austria, the
2For example, Seierstad et al., 2017; Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, 2018,
including national case studies from all ten countries (e.g., Lückerath-Rovers,
2016; Casaca, 2017; Arnardottir and Sigurjonsson, 2017; Gabaldon and
Gimenez, 2017; Kirsch, 2017; Kruisinga and Senden, 2017; Levrau, 2017;
Mensi-Klarbach, 2017; Rigolini and Huse, 2017; Seierstad and Huse, 2017;
Zenou et al., 2017; Gresch and Sauer, 2018; Espríto-Santo, 2018; Lépinard,
2018; Meier, 2018; ).
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Netherlands, Iceland, and Spain, CBQs use company
size, such as the number of employees, total balance
sheet, or assets, as the determining factor. Consequently,
it was difficult to ascertain and monitor the affected
companies.
Variations in CBQ hardness were classified into three
groups (see Table 1). Norway, Portugal, Belgium, Italy,
and Germany were found to have hard quotas, Norway
being on top of the list. Portugal and Belgium, which
use the open seat approach in addition to financial
penalties, were considered to have harder quotas than
Italy, which uses only financial penalties, and Germany,
which uses only the open seat approach. France and
Austria were found to have medium-hard quotas, the
former prescribing the open seat approach in addition to
financial penalties, and the latter, only the open seat
approach. The Netherlands, Iceland, and Spain were
characterized as using soft quotas because of rather weak
enforcement mechanisms and low wording precision.
The softest quota is that of Iceland, which has no
enforcement mechanisms or sanctions and defines
affected companies in a way that makes compliance
monitoring difficult.
Quota design: progressiveness
Year of acceptance. All CBQs were accepted between
2003 and 2017, Norway the first to do so. Spain followed
in 2007, and the two together were considered early to
accept quotas. Iceland, France, Belgium, Italy, and the
Netherlands were considered medium-early to accept,
given that their CBQs were introduced before European
Commissioner Reding’s legislative proposal at the EU
level in 2012. The third group (Germany, Portugal, and
Austria) introduced CBQs most recently (2015 and
2017) and were considered late to accept and thus less
progressive.
Quota targets. Although CBQs were meant to increase
board gender balance, variations in what this entails were
found. The specific terminology ranges from ‘balanced
representation, division, or composition’ and ‘equal
representation’ to ‘guarantee a minimum
percentage/proportion of each gender’. Some countries
use ‘balanced’ and ‘equal’ in different ways. Norway,
Spain, Iceland, and France (the first countries to introduce
CBQs), define ‘balanced’ as a minimum 40%
representation by either sex (Kanter, 1977). Belgium,
Italy, and Portugal prescribe a minimum of 33%, but the
Netherlands, Germany, and Austria require a minimum
of 30%.
Duration of laws, implementation period, and requested
increase. All countries except Italy and the Netherlands
have permanent CBQs. Comprehensive data on the
proportion of WoBs in affected companies were difficult
to obtain, but the proportion among the largest listed
companies is often an indicator of the status quo, allowing
differences in the requested increase to be determined
along with the implementation timeframe (see Appendix
1). Countries were rated from very high (Spain) to very
low (Germany) in this regard (see Table 2).
Scope and coverage. The types of companies affected
differed as well. In most countries, the affected companies
represent a small proportion of the total. Affected
companies are the public limited companies in Norway,
publicly listed companies in Belgium, Italy, and
Portugal, and co-determined and publicly listed
companies in Germany (see Appendix 1). By also
considering country size, the scope of companies affected
were determined as wide for Spain, Iceland, and the
Netherlands, medium for Norway, France, and Belgium
medium-narrow for Italy, Portugal, and Austria, and
narrow for Germany.
Based on progressiveness, each country was generally
classified as high, medium, or low (see Table 2). The
CBQs in Spain and Iceland were rated the most
progressive because their targets are high, and a wide
scope of companies is affected. Norway and France were
found to be high-medium progressive. The Norwegian
CBQ affects as lower scope of companies, but it was the
Table 1 Hardness
Quota law Enforcement Precision Hardness
Mechanism Sanctions
Norwegian Company Act Yes Corporate dissolution Clear and monitorable Hard
Portuguese Law Yes Open seats, monetary penalties Clear and monitorable
Belgian Company Act Yes Open seats, suspension of board fee payments Clear and monitorable
Italian Golfo Mosca Company Act Yes Monetary penalties Clear and monitorable
German Company Act Yes Open seats Clear and monitorable
French Copé Zimmerman Company Act Yes Open seats, suspension of board fee payments Clear definition, hard to monitor Medium Hard
Austrian Company Act Yes Open seats Clear definition, hard to monitor
Dutch Civil Code/Legal target No No; explain non-compliance Clear definition, hard to monitor Soft
Spanish Equality Act No No; positive incentive Clear definition, hard to monitor
Icelandic Company Act No No Clear definition, hard to monitor
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first to be introduced. The French CBQ was introduced
later and has a lower requested increase, but its scope
and coverage are high. Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and the
Netherlands were rated medium progressive, led by
Belgium, which has a target of 33%, a rather late
introduction of its CBQ, and coverage limited to publicly
listed companies. Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands
were found to be medium-low progressive. Italy and the
Netherlands have temporary CBQs, the latter having a
target of only 30%. Austria and Germany are low
progressive because their CBQs were among the latest to
be introduced, they require low or very low increases,
and they affect a limited number of companies.
Corporate board quota design: Hardness and
progressiveness. By combining hardness and
progressiveness, important differences between countries
were identified (see Figure 1). Spain, Iceland, Norway,
and France were found the most progressive, but they vary
in hardness from hard (Norway) to medium-hard (France)
to very soft (Iceland and Spain). The Dutch, Portuguese,
and Italian CBQswere similar in progressiveness, but also
vary in hardness, the Dutch being the softest. The Austrian
and German CBQs were low progressive but differed in
hardness.
The achievement of each CBQ was measured by
evaluating gender balance – the proportion of WoBs – in
the largest listed companies. Although some CBQs were
recent introductions (Portugal, Austria, and Germany),
some have been in place for years and should now be fully
implemented (Spain, Iceland, Norway, France, and Italy)
(see Appendix 1 for an overview).
Table 2 Progressiveness
Quota Laws Year of
Acceptance
Time Schedule for
Implementation
Quota
Target
Requested
Increase
Duration Scope and
Coverage
Progressiveness
Spanish Equality Act Early Long Balanced Very High Permanent Wide
HighIcelandic Company Act Medium Short Balanced High Permanent Wide
Norwegian Company Act Early Short/Medium Balanced Medium Permanent Medium
High-Medium
French Copé Zimmerman
Company Act
Medium Short Balanced Medium Permanent Medium
Belgian Company Act Medium Long Tilted High Permanent Medium Medium
Italian Golfo Mosca Company
Act
Medium Medium Tilted High Temporary Medium/
Narrow
Medium-LowPortuguese Law Late Short Tilted Medium Permanent Medium/
Narrow
Dutch Civil Code/Legal target Medium Medium/Long Tilted Low Temporary Wide
Austrian Company Act Late Medium Tilted Low Permanent Medium/
Narrow Low
German Company Act Late Medium Tilted Very Low Permanent Narrow
Figure 1 CBQs’ Hardness/Progressiveness Matrix [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Figure 1 shows that most of the largest listed companies
have complied with the CBQs by the end of the
implementation period. The exception is found in Spain.
The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and
Austria remain in their implementation periods, but
Germany and Belgium have already met the CBQ targets.
Institutional contexts
Gender equality. Equality standards are often measured
and benchmarked globally. Equality rankings, female
labor market participation, and welfare policies were
combined to provide a broad picture of a country’s
equality achievements (see Appendix 2).
Based on the World Economic Forum (2017) rankings,
we clustered Iceland and Norway as scoring high on
equality rankings. France, Germany, Spain score medium
while Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands score low
followed by Austria and Italy scoring very low. Countries
were ranked for their level of female labor force
participation, and the group was led by Iceland followed
by Norway and the Netherlands. Next, countries scoring
medium on this dimension are Germany, Austria,
Portugal Spain, France and. Belgium. Italy scores low
on female labor force participation. In terms of welfare
policies Iceland and Norway are comprehensive and
balanced while Germany and Italy are comprehensive.
Belgium, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Austria score medium on welfare.
Taken together, we clustered Iceland and Norway as
forming a group with high gender equality. Spain,
France, and Germany were deemed to have medium
gender equality; Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, and
Austria, medium-low gender equality; and Italy, low
gender equality.
The history of policy initiatives. All countries have
Equality Acts in place and universal suffrage, but leaders
and laggards were identified. Moreover, although all
countries use quotas to a certain extent in politics, the
scope of those policies and their points of introduction
vary (see Appendix 2).
Women won the right to vote in Norway in 1913, in
Iceland in 1915, in Germany and Austria in 1918, and in
Belgium and the Netherlands in 1919. However, in
France, Italy, and Portugal, this occurred in 1944, 1945,
and 1976, respectively. While it is not surprising that all
countries have Equality Acts, their points of introduction
vary (see Appendix 2). Thus, we divided the countries into
groups based on the point of policy initiatives. Norway,
Iceland, and the Netherlands were deemed leaders;
France, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and Austria,
medium adopters; and Spain and Italy, laggards.
Variations in scope and introduction of quotas in
politics, both voluntary and legislative, were found.
Some countries (e.g., Norway and Germany) have had
voluntary quotas in place in political parties for
decades, but these are restricted to a few political
parties for some (e.g., Italy and Spain). Voluntary party
quotas have been followed by legislative quotas in
some countries (e.g., Spain, France, Italy, Belgium,
and Portugal), but their use and scope vary (see
Appendix 2). Norway, France, Germany, and Belgium
were deemed to have comprehensive use of quotas in
politics, taking history and scope into consideration.
Iceland, Portugal, Austria, Spain, and Italy were found
to have medium use; the Netherlands to have low use.
Political support. Political and other specific factors and
events can create urgency, support, and/or legitimacy for
CBQs. In most countries, female politicians have played
key roles in introducing CBQs (see Appendix 3).
Moreover, in all countries, the business sector and
conservative politicians have been at the vanguard of
CBQ resistance (see Mensi-Klarbach et al., 2017).
Despite this opposition, introduction of CBQs suggests a
substantial level of political support and/or cooperation
between actors, creating a setting for CBQ establishment.
When CBQs were introduced, five of the ten
countries had center-left governments, three had center
governments, and two had center-right governments
(see Appendix 3). Echoing Terjesen et al. (2015), we
found that left-leaning governments tended to be
involved, but half of the countries had center or
center-right governments. In Norway and Iceland,
CBQs had broad political support when introduced. In
Norway, while the law accepted in 2003 was proposed
and implemented by a center-right government, this
was not the first country to discuss and propose a
CBQ. They were also proposed by center and left
politicians and political parties (Seierstad and Huse,
2017). In Iceland, the CBQ had broad political support
at the point of introduction. However, this country is
unique because the financial crisis brought urgency
and legitimacy. Ultimately, a wide range of actors from
multiple levels and political factions were involved in
the process of introducing the CBQ (Arnardottir and
Sigurjonsson, 2017).
France, Belgium, and Germany had medium support
among politicians when the CBQs were introduced. In
France, female politicians played key roles, yet there
was resistance from the President, right-wing Members
of Parliament, and senators (Lépinard, 2018). The
proposal for a CBQ in Belgium was put forth by a
coalition of individual Members of Parliament from
various factions (Levrau, 2017). The process of
introducing a CBQ in Germany was long, and debates
were heated. Support from women from various political
factions was critical, and in 2013, the CBQ formed part
of the Grand Coalition negotiation (Kirsch, 2017).
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In countries with medium-low CBQ support among
politicians, international diffusion and focus was
important, creating legitimacy. In Italy, female politicians
from various political factions were important in the
introduction of a CBQ after what has been described as a
‘tortuous passage through parliament’ (, p. 201). Reactions
to political scandals created urgency and legitimacy for the
introduction of a CBQ (Dona, 2018), but a rather narrow
group of political actors were crucial for introducing it
(Rigolini and Huse, 2017). Despite multiple initiatives,
the proportion of WoBs remained low, creating urgency
and some level of legitimacy for initiatives in the
Netherlands. However, the consensus was that increasing
the number of WoBs should be the responsibility of the
companies; the CBQ was only moderately supported by
politicians (Kruisinga and Senden, 2017). In Portugal, a
center-left government proposed the bill in 2016, but
throughout the political process, the letter of the bill was
weakened to increase its probability of passage (Casaca,
2017). Spain, the second country to introduce a CBQ,
did so in 2007 with a left-leaning government that put
gender equality, including the CBQ law, part of the
Equality Act, on the agenda. However, overall support
for the CBQ was rather limited (Gabaldon and Gimenez,
2017). In Austria, a certain reluctance to the CBQ was
expressed, and it was introduced following events in
Europe, particularly Germany, as opposed to urgency
and legitimacy for change among politicians (Mensi-
Klarbach, 2017).
The political setting is volatile, and changes in
governments and political parties in power can affect the
focus on and support for CBQs. In Norway, Iceland,
France, and Belgium, support has been maintained or
even increased, resulting in broad or medium-broad
support after introduction. This occurred despite changes
(often multiple) in the political parties in power. In
France, Belgium, and Iceland, further quota policies or
equality initiatives have been introduced.
In the Netherlands, despite changes in political parties
in power, medium-low political support has continued
(Kruisinga and Senden, 2017). It has also continued in
Germany, but in an environment without changes in
government since the introduction of the CBQ in 2015.
Little change in political support has been seen in
Portugal since the recent introduction of a CBQ in 2017.
At the introduction stage, Spain showed medium-low
political support, and this has continued. Moreover, a
significant weakening of focus on both the CBQ and
equality in general has occurred with the change to a
right-leaning government (Gabaldon and Gimenez,
2017). A CBQ can be fragile without overall and broad
political support, as seen in Spain. In Italy, despite the
introduction of CBQs and quotas in politics, it is argued
that gender quotas are symbolic, and the uncertainty of
the political situation makes further equality and CBQ
support fragile (Dona, 2018). In Austria, one of the last
countries to introduce a CBQ with low initial support, a
change in government has resulted in a weakening of the
CBQ (Gresch and Sauer, 2018).
Our analysis has led us to identify three broad groups
of countries (see Table 3). Norway and Iceland were
characterized as having favorable institutional contexts.
This is materialized in a high level of equality, leading
in equality initiatives, a relatively comprehensive use
of quotas in politics (albeit only voluntary), and broad
political support for CBQs at the introduction stage
and thereafter. France was characterized as having a
favorable/neutral institutional context because it has
medium gender equality, albeit with comprehensive use
of quotas in politics and increasing political support for
CBQs. Belgium and Germany were deemed to have
neutral contexts. With medium gender equality, they
have comprehensive use of quotas in politics (including
legal in the case of Belgium) and medium political
support for the CBQ at introduction; this has increased.
Germany has maintained support, but the CBQ has only
recently been introduced. Finally, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Austria, Spain, and Italy were deemed to have
neutral/unfavorable contexts. They have medium or
little (as in the case of the Netherlands) use of quotas
in politics, and all, except for the Netherlands, are
considered to be medium or laggards in their
Table 3 Institutional contexts
Country Equality History of Political Initiatives Political Support Institutional Context
Time of Introduction Quotas in Politics At Introduction Post Introduction
Norway High Leader Comprehensive Broad Maintained
FavourableIceland High Leader Medium Broad Maintained
France Medium Middle Comprehensive Medium Increased Favourable/Neutral
Belgium Medium/Low Middle Comprehensive Medium Increased
NeutralGermany Medium/High Middle Comprehensive Medium Maintained
Netherlands Medium/Low Leaders Little Medium/Low Maintained Neutral/Unfavourable
Portugal Medium/Low Middle Medium Medium/Low -
Austria Medium/Low Middle Medium Medium/Low Declined
Spain Medium Laggards Medium Medium/Low Declined
Italy Low Laggards Medium Medium/Low Maintained
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introductions of equality initiatives. All these countries
showed medium/low political support for the CBQ at
introduction, and in many cases, the CBQ was ‘watered
down’ to achieve passage. This level of support has been
maintained or has declined, as in Spain and Austria. The
change of support for CBQs in these countries results
from changes in the government from left- to right-
leaning coalitions.
Discussion
In our response to calls for further comparative studies
(Terjesen and Sealy, 2016; Kirsch, 2018), we have
contributed to the ongoing scholarly and policy debates
about CBQs and their implications. We have provided a
conceptual framework for CBQ comparisons, suggesting
hardness and progressiveness as key dimensions for quota
design. In addition, the institutional context in which the
CBQs are embedded must be acknowledged and
understood.
Variations in CBQ design. State interventions into
corporate boards are highly contested and often resisted.
While discussions about WoBs often focus on a
distinction between hard and soft regulations (i.e., CBQs
vs. targets) (Klettner et al., 2016), we found variations
among the CBQs. Research alludes to the importance of
acknowledging differences related to quota design (Sojo
et al., 2016); we extended the literature focus on CBQs
and acknowledge the importance of design, proposing
use of the dimensions hardness and progressiveness. Both
dimensions, which together make up the CBQ design,
affect the CBQ mandate for change. Even though CBQs
are considered radical (Jewson andMason, 1986) because
they prescribe outcomes, we propose that design
variations in CBQs must be taken into account both by
policymakers designing CBQs and scholars discussing
and researching them.
Relevance of the institutional context. Literature on quotas
(e.g., Lépinard and Rubio-Marín, 2018) and WoBs (e.g.
Terjesen et al., 2015; Hughes et al., 2017; Mensi-Klabach
et al., 2017) emphasizes the relevance of the institutional
context. We argue that unfavorable institutional contexts
do not necessarily prevent governments from introducing
CBQs (because actors and events might mitigate this, see
Seierstad et al., 2017), but they might affect both their
design and potential achievements.
Our analysis revealed a pattern: CBQs tend to be more
progressive when introduced in a favorable institutional
context. Additionally, the point of CBQ introduction
is relevant, and countries with highly supportive
environments were among the first/early adopters. We
found that CBQ introduction triggered heated and
controversial debates and caused resistance. Aguilera and
Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) argued that the struggle and
resistance against ‘hard solutions’ result in the spread of
soft regulations; this argument resonates with the fact that
the quota law proposed by the European Commission was
blocked (Reding, 2017). We extend this argument and
assume that resistance can be manifested in CBQ design.
While we do not see a relationship between institutional
context and CBQ hardness (i.e., hard quotas can be found
in favorable, neutral, and unfavorable contexts), we
propose that countries with favorable institutional contexts
are likely to introduce CBQs that are more progressive
compared to neutral or unfavorable institutional contexts.
An anticipated finding is that hard CBQs are met no
matter the institutional context. For instance, in Italy,
where there the institutional context is neutral to
unfavorable, the number ofWoBs among the largest listed
companies increased significantly, possibly motivated by
strong penalties for non-compliance. This leads us to
propose that hard CBQs lead to compliance and a
significant increase in WoBs no matter the institutional
context. In Spain, where the CBQ is rather soft and the
institutional context similar to that in Italy, the CBQ target
has not been met. Thus, we propose that in
unfavorable/neutral institutional contexts, soft CBQs do
not necessarily result in meeting their goals. In contrast,
in Iceland, where a favorable institutional context was
observed, the CBQ target has been met even though the
law was found to be soft (i.e., without strong legal
sanctions).
In our study, we found different quota scenarios with
countries complying with, but also circumventing the
CBQ. We therefore argue that an evaluation of
institutional contexts matters when introducing and
designing CBQs, acknowledging that in an unfavorable
institutional context, a soft CBQ might not lead to the
intended increase in WoBs, whereas in a supportive
institutional context, even soft CBQs can result in
intended changes.
Triggering equality change beyond corporate boards. The
extent to which equality beyond the board setting can be
fostered by CBQs remains unclear. Our analysis showed
that soft CBQs are not met in neutral/unfavorable
institutional environments; therefore, a limited wider
equality reach can be assumed. The question remains
whether equality will be greater if CBQs are met. Klettner
et al. (2016: 396) argued that ‘Mandatory quotas may
achieve early and significant results in terms of female
board representation. …) [but] evidence suggests that
voluntary targets for women’s participation on boards
and in executive ranks, set by the companies themselves
may in some circumstances promote more effective
cultural and practical change’. Building on this argument,
we suggest that softer regulations, though with clear and
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ambitious targets and in favorable institutional contexts
with the involvement of multiple actors, might have the
capacity to facilitate change because they involve more
corporate strategic choice, actors, and actions. Thus, while
hard CBQs might lead to a focus on compliance in the
board setting, a shared desire to increase overall gender
equality is not a given. Hence, we could assume that
additional initiatives and involvement from a variety of
actors is necessary to encourage commitment and
potential for wider gender equality.
Areas for further research. While our study provides
important findings, we acknowledge its limitations and
areas for further research.
The introduction of quotas at the EU level has been
heavily debated at multiple points in time, highly
supported and advocated for by both the former and
current EU Justice Commissioners, Viviane Reding and
Vera Jourova. As we found in our study, the EU focus
on gender diversity on corporate boards and its support
for mandatory quota regulations have impacted CBQ
regulations in some countries. Thus, further research
could explore the impact of EU in promoting and/or
discouraging CBQs in its member states.
Countries outside Europe have introduced CBQs, and
we suggest that an important area for further research is
a more comprehensive analysis of CBQs, building upon
the framework of quota design proposed in this study.
Moreover, we acknowledge that within the group of
countries that introduced soft targets, variations remain,
and a similar study investigating these is important.
Moreover, while we have focused on a wide range of
institutional contextual factors, we acknowledge that other
national specificities are important. In particular, we
welcome studies to evaluate the use of various regulations,
the corporate governance system, and achievements in
terms of WoBs.
Finally, the question of how CBQs impact a wider
equality reach is complex, and empirical data is both
scarce and inconclusive. Building on our analysis of
contexts, acknowledging that cultural change toward
increased gender equality needs broad support and
persuasion of relevant actors (Spender, 2012), we
suggest that future research focus on how gender
equality in corporate leadership has changed amid
various institutional contexts with or without CBQs
(and soft regulations), thus examining the potential of
various types of initiatives to accelerate change toward
further equality (e.g., at executive levels and boards
not affected by CBQs). Because most CBQs were
recently introduced, and many remain in their
implementation periods, it is too early to comment on
their full effects; hence, this is an important area for
further research.
Conclusions
Although CBQs are currently in place in ten European
countries, they are further discussed within and beyond
Europe and at the supranational level. An increase in
WoB research has focused on various regulations, but
research on CBQs is arguably in its infancy (Hughes
et al., 2017). In this study, we examined ten European
CBQs and offer a deeper understanding of various CBQ
scenarios. Important similarities and differences in what
we consider to be two key dimensions—CBQ design
(hardness and progressiveness) and the institutional
context in which they are embedded—were explored,
advancing the discussion of CBQs and WoBs beyond
the rather misleading dichotomy of voluntary targets vs.
mandatory quotas. We proposed a framework for
understanding CBQ design based on hardness and
progressiveness, and we suggested that configuration of
CBQ design and institutional context in which a CBQ is
embedded results in differing scenarios which can affect
the CBQ’s potential for increasing female representation
on boards and beyond.
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Appendix 2. Gender Equality and History of Equality Initiatives
Gender equality History of equality initiatives
Country WEF Global Gender
Gap 2006, 2017
(High: 1–10a; Medium:
11–30; Low: 31+)
Female labor force
participation (2017) (%)
(High: >74; Medium:
60–74; Low: <60)
Welfare policies
(maternity/paternity
leave)(days)
(Comprehensive: >230;
Medium: 100–229;
Low: <100: Low.
Balanced: > 50
for paternity)
Point of introduction of
Equality Act
(Early: around introduction
of the EEC 1976; Medium:
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997;
Late: EU Directive 2006)
Point of introduction of women’s
suffrage
(Early: 1900–1920; Medium:
1921–1950; Late: 1951+)
Quotas in political parties
(comprehensiveness based
on timeliness and scope)
Norway • Rank 2, 2
• Labor force participation:
76.2 (male 80.3)
• Welfare: Maternity 70,
Paternity 70, Parental 203/273
• Suffrage 1913
• Equality Act 1978
Voluntary Political Party quotas:
• Liberal Party (1974) 40%
• Social left (1975), 40%
• Norwegian Labor Party (1983), 50%/
• Center Party (1989), 40%
• Christian People’s Party (1989), 40%
Spain • Rank 11, 24
• Labor force participation:
68.9 (79.7 male)
• Welfare: Maternity 112,
Paternity 13
• Suffrage 1931
• Equality Act 2007
Voluntary Political Party Quotas:
• Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party
(1988/1997), 25/40
• United Left (1987/1997), 25/40
• Four Regional Parties (1991–2002)
30/40
Legislative Quotas (since 2007), 40%
Iceland • Rank 4, 1
• Labor force participation:
83.2 (87.5 male)
• Welfare Maternity 90,
Paternity 90, Parental
• Suffrage 1915
• Equality Act 1976
Voluntary Political Party Quotas
• The Social Democratic Alliance
(1999), 40%
• Progressive Party (2005), 50%
• The Left Green Movement
(Gender aware)
• All Women’s Party
France • Rank 70, 11
• Labor force participation:
67.2 (75.1 male)
• Welfare: Maternity 112,
Paternity 11
• Suffrage 1944
• Equality in Constitution 1946
Legislative quotas of 50% electoral lists
(since 2000s)
Voluntary quotas
• Labor party (1990), 50%
Italy • Rank 77, 82
• Labor force participation:
54.3 (73.7 male)
• Welfare: Maternity 150,
Paternity 1, Parental 300
• Suffrage 1945
• Code for Equal Opportunities 2006
Voluntary Party Quotas
• Democratic party (2008), 50%
Legislative quotas Sub National Level
• 12 out of 20 regions (since the 2003)
Belgium • Rank 20, 31
• Labor force participation
63.4 (72.8 male)
• Suffrage 1919
• Equality Act 2007
Legislative quotas (first introduced in 1994)
• The single/lower house
• The Upper House
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Table (Continued)
Gender equality History of equality initiatives
• Welfare: Maternity 105,
Paternity 10, Parental 120
• Sub National Level
Netherlands • Rank 12, 32
• Labor force participation:
74.2 (male 84.6)
• Welfare: Maternity 112,
Paternity 2
• Suffrage 1919
• Act of equal treatment between
men and women (1980)
Voluntary Party Quotas
• Labor Party (1986), alternated
• Green Left (not specified)
Germany • Rank 5, 12
• Labor force participation: 73.1 (82.6 male)
• Welfare: Maternity 98, Paternity 0, Parental 360
• Suffrage 1918
• Equality Act 2006
Voluntary Political Party Quotas
• Social Democratic Party of Germany
(1988/1998), 25/40%
• The Left Party, Zipper system
• Alliance 90/The Greens (1986), 50%
• Christian Democratic Union (1996), 33%
Portugal • Rank 33, 33
• Labor force participation: 70.0 (76.8 male)
• Welfare: Maternity 120, Paternity 10
• Suffrage 1976
• Gender Equality Act 1979
Legislative quotas (since 2006) of 33.3%
• Single/Lower House
• Sub-National Level
Austria • Rank 27, 57
• Labor force participation: 71.0 (80.0 male)
• Welfare: Maternity 112
• Suffrage 1918
• Equality Act 2004
Voluntary Party Quotas
• The Green Alternative (1993), 50%
• Austrian Peoples Party (1995), 33%
• Social Democratic Party (1985), 40%
aSources: European Equality Law Network (https://www.equalitylaw.eu/); International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Gender Quotas
Database (www.idea.in; www.quotaproject.org); Seierstad et al., 2017a,b; Terjesen et al. 2015; WEF, Global Gender Gap Reports 2006/2017.
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